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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. White argued that the district court's decision to use a 
magistrate's probable cause determination as the sole basis to support its finding that 
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation by committing a new offense violated his 
due process right to confront witnesses. This brief is necessary to address the State's 
argument that it was not required to produce a witness, Officer Koontz, at the probation 
violation evidentiary hearing because Mr. White had the ability to subpoena Officer 
Koontz. The State's argument is not supported by any authority and is directly contrary 
to controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, the State's argument 
confuses the right to confront witness with the right to call witnesses. 
Mr. White also argued that the district court's reliance on a magistrate's probable 
cause determination to find that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation violated 
his right to due process because it lowered the State's evidentiary burden from 
preponderance of the evidence standard to a probable cause standard. This brief is 
necessary to address the State's assertion that a preponderance of the evidence 
standard is not the correct legal standard. This brief is also necessary to address the 
State's alternative argument that Mr. White's right to due process was not violated when 
the district court applied the incorrect legal standard when determining that Mr. White 
violated the terms of his probation. 
Mr. White also argued that the district court's determination that he violated the 
terms of his probation was clearly erroneous because the district court did not rely on 
any evidence when reaching its conclusion. The State counters with the argument that 
1 
the minutes of the preliminary hearing provide a factual basis for the district court's 
finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation. Contrary to the State 
assertion, the district court did not make any factual findings or provide any reasoning 
based on the minutes of the preliminary hearing, and those constitutionally mandated 
findings cannot be presumed on appeal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. White's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the district court violate Mr. White's right to due process when it denied him 
the right to confront witnesses and lowered the State's evidentiary burden during 
the probation evidentiary hearing? 
2) Is the district court's finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation 
clearly erroneous? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied Him The 
Right To Confront Witnesses And Lowered The State's Evidentiary Burden During The 
Probation Evidentiary Hearing 
A. The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied 
Him The Right To Confront Witnesses 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. White argued that the district court's decision to use a 
magistrate's probable cause determination as the sole basis to support its finding that 
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation by committing a new offense violated his 
due process right to confront witnesses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) In response, the 
State argued that it is not required "to produce a witness in order to establish that 
[Mr. White] violated his probation." (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-13.) The State cites no 
authority for this proposition. Not only is the State's argument unsupported by authority, 
but it was also expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). In that case, Melendez-Diaz was being 
charged with distributing cocaine and trafficking in cocaine. Id. at 308. At trial, the 
government submitted three "certificates of analysis" created by a laboratory technician 
indicating that the substance at issue was cocaine. Id. Melendez-Diaz objected to this 
on the basis of the Confrontation Clause and argued that the laboratory technician had 
to testify in person. Id. at 309. 
The issue eventually made its way to the United States Supreme Court, and one 
of the arguments proffered by the government was that a lab technician's reports were 
not subject to the Confrontation Clause because the analysis contained in the reports 
did not constitute "accusatory" witnesses. Id. at 313. While rejecting this argument, the 
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Melendez-Diaz Court drew a distinction between the Confrontation Clause and the 
Compulsory Process Clause, holding that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees a 
defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses 'against him,' the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses 'in his favor."' Id. 
"The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call the latter." Id. at 
313-314 ( original emphasis) (footnote omitted). 
After clarifying the difference between with the Confrontation Clause and the 
Compulsory Process Clause, Melendez-Diaz Court addressed a separate argument that 
"we should find no Confrontation Clause violation in this case because [Melendez-Diaz] 
had the ability to subpoena the analysts." Id. at 324. In rejecting this argument, the 
Court held: 
But that power--whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process 
Clause-is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the 
Confrontation Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant 
when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear. 
Converting the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause into the 
defendant's privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause 
shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to 
the accused. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a 
burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant 
to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is 
not replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence 
via ex parle affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants 
if he chooses. 
Id. at 324-325. Accordingly, the mere fact that Mr. White could have subpoenaed 
Officer Koontz to testify does not alleviate the State of its burden to present witnesses. 
As such, the State's argument that the right to confront witnesses during probation 
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proceedings only afforded Mr. White the ability to subpoena the police officer confuses 
the right to confront witnesses with the right to call witnesses. 
Additionally, both Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), afford parolees and probationers1 separate rights which 
are analogous to rights protected by the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory 
Process Clause. According to the Morrissey Court, the minimal due process protections 
afforded to probationers and parolees include: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the 
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opporiunity to be heard in person and 
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral 
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members 
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written 
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). As mentioned above, the Confrontation 
Clause requires the State to produce witnesses and the Compulsory Process Clause 
provides the defendant the ability to call witnesses. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S at 313-
314, 324-325. Morrissey provides parolees and probationers analogues to these two 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morrissey, 408 
U.S. at 489. It follows that Mr. White's ability to call witnesses on his own behalf at the 
evidentiary hearing did not alleviate the State's burden to produce witnesses necessary 
for it to prove that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation agreement. 
1 Gagnon extended the holdings from Morrissey to probationers and, as such, the same 
conditions applicable to parole revocation proceedings are applicable to probation 
revocation proceedings. State v. Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012). 
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One might argue that the holding from Melendez-Diaz is not applicable to 
probation proceedings. As argued above, Morrissey provides probationers the right to 
call witnesses and a separate right to confront witnesses. The difference between 
these two rights would be meaningless if the ability to call witnesses subsumed the right 
to confront witnesses. Moreover, the plain language Morrissey indicates that the State 
must provide witnesses when requested by a parolee or probationer. In fact, this 
language was quoted by the State in its Respondents' Brief, to wit, "[o]n request of the 
parolee, [a] person who has given adverse information on which parole revocation is to 
be based is to be made available for questioning in his presence." (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.6, 10 (quoting Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 487) (emphasis added).) The requirement that 
the requested witness "is to be made available" is a clear indication that the State must 
provide witnesses which are adverse to the parolee or probationer upon the parolee's or 
probationer's request. Id. If the foregoing sentence actually supported the State's 
position, it would have stated that a parolee may call adverse witnesses to testify. 
However, the United State's Supreme Court used mandatory language indicating that 
the State must produce the requested witness. 
Mr. White's primary argument in his Appellant's Brief, is that under State v. 
Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 806 (Ct. App. 1998), the district court failed to engage in a 
mandatory balancing test before it determined that there was good cause for denying 
Mr. White's request to confront Officer Koontz. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) In 
response, the State argues: 
The state acknowledges that the Court in Farmer engaged in such an 
analysis; however, the question is whether the Court was required to do 
so. The state submits it was not because the good cause analysis only 
applies when the probationer or parolee is prevented from questioning an 
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adverse witness. This is consistent with the right as it was articulated in 
Morrissey where the Court noted that the parolee could request to 
question an adverse witness, but the hearing officer could prevent such a 
questioning if he "determine[d] that an informant would be subjected to 
risk of harm if his identity were disclosed." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. 
Because the district court did not prevent [Mr. White] from calling 
any witnesses, [Mr. White] was not deprived of his right to confront the 
evidence against him and the court was not required to engage in a good 
cause analysis. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.) 
The State's position, that the district court was not required to conduct the 
balancing test required under the Farmer holding, is specious at best. There is no 
question that the district court in this matter was required to conduct the balancing test 
promulgated in Farmer, because Farmer is binding precedent. The district court was 
not free to disregard appellate precedent, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently 
observed: 
Trial courts are not free to willfully disregard precedent from the appellate 
courts of this state. We reiterate our previous position on this subject: 
The entire Court membership had the same understanding 
as to the effect of a new principle of law announced by the 
Court of Appeals; it becomes precedential law of this state, 
and all tribunals inferior to the Court of Appeals are obligated 
to abide by decisions issued by the Court of Appeals. To our 
knowledge, neither a district judge nor a trial judge has ever 
suggested not being bound by new principles of law, 
whether they emanate from this Court or from the Court of 
Appeals .... 
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992) 
(emphasis in original). Although the district court's statements in this case 
demonstrate that the final partial sentence in this quotation is now 
outdated, we take this opportunity to remind trial judges that they do not 
have the liberty to consciously disregard the principles of law articulated 
by the appellate courts of this state. 
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State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314,325 n.6 (2012). 
The State's argument is also flawed because it is based on a misunderstanding 
of the right to confront witnesses and the separate right to call witnesses. When a 
probationer exercises his/her right to confront witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, the 
State has the burden to produce the requested witness. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S at 
313-314, 324-325; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487, 489. In the event the State provides 
good cause2 to deny the probationer this right to confront a specific witness, then the 
district court must conduct the balancing test mandated by Farmer. 3 It should also be 
noted that a different test is applied when the district court denies a probationer the right 
to call witnesses. In order to establish prejudice for the denial of the right to call 
witnesses the following standards are applied: 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the 
states by the fourteenth amendment, obliges the government, upon 
request, to make a good faith effort to locate and to secure witnesses 
favorable to the defense. See generally Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). "[T]he compulsory process 
clause gives defendants definite but limited protection: it guarantees not 
that the state will always succeed in producing witnesses for the defense, 
but that it will make an appropriate effort to do so." Westen, Confrontation 
and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal 
Cases, 91 HARV.L.REV. 567, 595 (1978) (hereinafter cited as 
Confrontation and Compulsory Process ). 
2 A risk of harm to the witness, the invocation of a testimonial privilege, significant 
expense, and other significant difficulty could be the basis for a finding of good cause. 
See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487; see also Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804, 808 
~D.C. 2004). 
The State concedes that it did not provide any reason why Officer Koontz was not 
available to testify at Mr. White's probation violation evidentiary hearing. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.5.) 
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When a person is available the state must procure his attendance if he 
would be a witness favorable to the defense, competent to give testimony 
that is relevant and material. 
Relevant Testimony. "A defendant has no constitutional right to produce 
witnesses whose testimony is wholly irrelevant to his defense." 
Material Testimony. Materiality goes to the weight of the evidence. Factors 
in determining materiality include the relative importance of the issue, the 
extent to which the issue is in dispute, the number of other witnesses who 
have testified on the issue and the credibility of the witness in relation to 
other witnesses. 
State v. Garza, 109 Idaho 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 1985) (original emphasis). In order to 
preserve the denial of the right to call witnesses for appellate review, the probationer 
must make an offer of proof establishing that the witness at issue would provide 
favorable, relevant, and material evidence. State v. Hanslovan, 116 Idaho 266, 268 
(Ct. App. 1989). 
Two points can be adduced from the foregoing. First, a materiality test is applied 
when the right to call a witness is denied. This is entirely different than the good cause 
balancing test which must be applied before denying a probationer the right to confront 
witnesses. Second, even when a probationer exercises his/her right to call a witness 
the State has an affirmative obligation to "make an appropriate effort" to produce the 
witness for the defendant. Garza, 109 Idaho at 42. Again the State is arguing, 
"[b]ecause the district court did not prevent [Mr. White] from calling any witnesses, 
[Mr. White] was not deprived of his right to confront the evidence against him and the 
court was not required to engage in a good cause analysis." (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.10-12.) The State's argument interchanges a compulsory process issue, right to call 
witnesses, with the issue of the denial of the right to confront witnesses. But even 
assuming Mr. White was making a compulsory process claim, which he is not, the State 
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does not cite to the correct test which is utilized when a probationer advances a 
compulsory process claim on appeal. Even if Mr. White made a compulsory process 
claim, the State still had the obligation to make reasonable attempts to procure the 
witness for him, which it did not. 
The State also argues that even if Mr. White is correct that the district court erred 
by failing to conduct the good cause balancing test the error is harmless because 
Mr. White had an opportunity to cross-examine the State's witness at the preliminary 
hearing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) The error is not harmless because the 
motivations during cross-examination at a preliminary hearing are different than the 
motivations to cross-examine a witness at an evidentiary hearing for a probation 
violation. For example, some defense attorneys will not rigorously cross-examine the 
State's witnesses at a preliminary hearing as a tactic to prevent disclosing potential trial 
strategies. Additionally, Mr. White could have discovered impeachment evidence which 
he was not aware of at the time of preliminary hearing. Further, since the State failed to 
even provide a transcript of the preliminary hearing, Mr. White was not able to 
undermine the district court's probable cause determination with the minutes of the 
preliminary hearing alone. Mr. White also submits, based on the separate due process 
violation address in Section 1B, infra, that this error cannot be harmless because the 
district court employed a probable cause determination in lieu of a preponderance of the 
evidence determination. 
In sum, the State's arguments are contrary to controlling precedent and are 
based on a misapplication of that precedent. As such, the State's arguments should be 
rejected as meritless. 
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B. The District Court Violated Mr. White's Ri ht To Due Process When It Lowered 
The State's Evidentiary Burden During The Guilt Phase Of The Probation 
Revocation Hearing 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. White argued that his right to due process was 
denied when the district court relied on a probable cause determination in order to find 
that Mr. White violated the terms of probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) For the 
purposes of this appeal, the State assumes that a preponderance of the evidence 
standard applies. (Respondent's Brief, p.13, n.4.) However, it also asserts there is no 
authority for this proposition, because there is no clear case law holding that a 
preponderance of the evidence standard is applied during probation revocation 
proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, p.13, n.4.) It should be noted that the State does not 
refute Mr. White's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the State must 
provide the same process when terminating a probationer from probation as it does 
when revoking a parolee's parole, State v. Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012), and 
that I.C. § 20-2298 provides that a preponderance of the evidence standard is 
applicable at parole revocation proceedings. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12.) It follows that a 
preponderance of the evidence standard must be applied during probation revocation 
proceedings; otherwise the proceedings which occur during probation revocation would 
not be the same as those which occur prior to the revocation of parole. 
Additionally, in Morrissey, it was held that an evidentiary hearing "must be the 
basis for more than determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any 
contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant 
revocation." Id. at 488. Mr. White is not aware of an evidentiary standard which is 
higher than probable cause and lower than a preponderance of the evidence. Logic 
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dictates that the standard has to preponderance of the evidence. The only other 
alternative standard is a clear and convincing standard, because the State need not 
prove a probation violation beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 
762, 765 (2007). 
The State next argues that the district court did not apply the wrong standard 
because "there is nothing that would preclude a court from finding that the same 
evidence that establishes probable cause also satisfies the higher standard of proof and 
there is nothing in the record to support the claim that the district court applied the 
wrong standard of proof." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) In support of this, the State cites 
to Morrissey for the proposition that "Obviously a parolee cannot relitigate issues 
determined against him in other forums." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) There are a 
couple of problems with the State's argument, the first is that the quote from Morrissey 
is misleading because that was reference to a prior conviction, which can be used to 
establish a probation violation. The full sentence follows, "Obviously a parolee cannot 
relitigate issues determined against him in other forums, as in the situation presented 
when the revocation is based on conviction of another crime." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 
490 (emphasis added). Mr. White is not contending that an evidentiary hearing is an 
appropriate forum to collaterally attack a prior conviction. Moreover, the use of a prior 
conviction as the sole basis for a finding that a probationer violated a term of probation 
is consistent with Mr. White's argument because the standard for a criminal conviction is 
beyond a reasonable doubt which is much higher than a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 649, 651 n.1 (Ct. App. 2013). Further, the notion 
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that a new conviction can be used as the basis for a probation violation is well 
established in Idaho. Id. at 650-652. 
The second problem with the State's argument is it assumes the district court 
was considering the "same evidence" as the magistrate, when, in fact, the two judges 
were considering very different information. (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) The magistrate 
was actually listening to the police officer's live testimony. (02/21/14 Minutes of the 
Preliminary Hearing, pp.1-2 (11/03/14 Augmentation).) In this case, the district court 
only had the minutes of the preliminar1 hearing, so the district court did not have access 
to the actual testimony provided during the preliminary hearing. Moreover, the minutes 
of a preliminary hearing are merely a clerk's own interpretation of what occurred at the 
preliminary hearing, which might not accurately represent what occurred at that hearing. 
As argued in Section 11, infra, the district court did not make any factual findings based 
on the minutes of the preliminary hearing, so it was only considering the magistrate's 
probable cause determination. 
The State also argues that Brandt v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 135 
Idaho 208 (Ct. App. 2000),4 does not support Mr. White's claim of error. In Brandt, the 
Court of Appeals held that a probable cause hearing conducted for a misdemeanor 
charge was not the equivalent of the preliminary prerevocation hearing described in 
Morrissey. Id. at 210-212. In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned 
4 It should be noted that in Brandt, the Court of Appeals cited to Morrissey for the 
proposition that, "[o]n the parolee's request, the source of the adverse information upon 
which the violation report is based must be made available for questioning in the 
parolee's presence." Brandt, 135 Idaho at 210 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487.) 
This interpretation of the right to confront witnesses set forth in Morrissey is consistent 
with Mr. White's position set forth in Section IA, supra. 
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that the procedures employed during the misdemeanor preiiminary hearing, where not 
as stringent as ones employed during a probation violation preliminary hearing. Id. at 
211-212. The State argues that the foregoing holding is not helpful to Mr. White 
because the "Court of Appeals' determination in Brandt that the court failed to comply 
with the procedural requirements under Morrissey has no bearing on White's claim that 
the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in its revocation decision." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16 (footnote omitted).) 
The implicit premise in the State's argument is that the application of the 
appropriate legal standard, preponderance of the evidence, is not a procedural 
requirement. Contrary to the State's unsupported assertion, due process requires that 
the district court employ the correct legal standard when revoking probation. In his 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Whites cited to State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685-686 (Ct. 
App. 2010), for the proposition that a "due process violation occurs when the State's 
evidentiary burden has been artificially lowered by its own actions or the actions of the 
court." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) According to the Erickson Court: 
The requirement that the State prove every element of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of 
due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2783, 
61 L.Ed.2d 560, 567 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942, 188 
P.3d 867, 884 (2008); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47, 13 P.3d 1256, 
1260 (Ct.App.2000). This standard of proof "plays a vital role in the 
American scheme of criminal procedure" because it "provides concrete 
substance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and 
elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.' " In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 
S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 402, 39 L.Ed. 481, 491 (1895)). It 
follows that a misstatement to a jury of the State's burden rises to the level 
of fundamental error because it goes to the foundation of the case and 
would take away from a defendant a right essential to his or her defense. 
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769, 864 P.2d at 607. 
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Id. Similarly, the requirement that a district court must find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a probationer violated the terms of probation before revoking probation, 
is a procedure at the center of Morrissey. The other procedures required by Morrissey, 
which include written notice of alleged violations, disclosure of adverse evidence, the 
right call witnesses, the right to confront witnesses, etc ... , Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 
would be meaningless if the district court could erroneously use a lower evidentiary 
standard when determining whether a probationer violated the terms of probation. If the 
State's argument were taken to its logical conclusion, the initial probable cause 
determination required to hold a probationer for a probation violation, could be used to 
replace the subsequent evidentiary hearing, which requires more than a probable cause 
determination. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488. 
In sum, the district court's sole reliance on a magistrate's probable cause 
determination to find that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation violated his rights 
to due process because it lowered the State's evidentiary burden from preponderance 
of the evidence to probable cause. The State has failed to provide authority or a logical 
argument for the proposition that some standard, other than a preponderance of the 
evidence, is applied during a probation evidentiary hearing. Further, the State 
incorrectly asserts that the use of the correct legal standard is not part of the legal 
procedures mandated by Morrissey. 
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11. 
The District Court's Finding That Mr. White Violated The Terms Of His Probation Is 
Clearly Erroneous 
Mr. White argued that the district court abused its discretion because it made no 
factual findings, other than relying on another judge's determination there was probable 
cause to believe that Mr. White had committed a new criminal offense, that Mr. White 
actually violated a term of his probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) The State 
responds, by arguing that the minutes from the preliminary hearing provide factual 
support for the district court's finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.15, 17-18.) 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the district court did not provide any analysis of 
the minutes of the preliminary hearing, so it cannot be said that it relied on any 
evidence, other than the district court's probable cause determination. According the 
district court, "I find that allegation one has been proven as [it] pertains to driving under 
the influence and that that was willful based on the minutes of the February 21st, 2014, 
hearing, the order holding or bindover order that was signed that same day . . .. " 
(Tr., p.9, Ls.1-9.) The Court then rejected the allegation that Mr. White violated the 
terms of his probation for driving without privileges because the only evidence submitted 
in support of that violation was Officer Koontz's traffic citation. (Tr., p.9, Ls.15-22.) 
According to the district court, "in order for me to take judicial notice there has to be 
something in the file that would indicate that a neutral detached magistrate's taken a 
look at it and determined that probable cause exists, so that has not been proven." 
(Tr., p.9, Ls.16-21.) The district court made it clear that it was making the determination 
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that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation solely on the magistrate's probable 
cause determination. 
Equally of importance is the fact that the district court did not orally provide any 
analysis of the minutes from the preliminary hearing and failed to provide factual 
findings based on those minutes. In other words, the district court was not exercising its 
own independent judgment based on the minutes of the preliminary hearing. Instead, it 
was solely relying on the magistrate's probable cause determination. This is important 
because Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 and State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 152-153 
(1986) both require either an oral or "written statement by the factfinders as to the 
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation]." "The written statement 
required by . . . Morrissey helps to insure accurate factfinding with respect to any 
alleged violation and provides an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision 
rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence." Id. at 152-153 ( quoting 
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (original emphasis).) As such, the State's 
appellate assertion that the district court considered the same evidence as the 
magistrate court is not accurate. Additionally, the State cannot for the first time on 
appeal, point to the minutes of the preliminary hearing and argue from that there is 
evidence which supports the district court's reasoning where the district court failed to 
make factual findings and provide its analysis based on those findings. 
As a final point, there is a relevant distinction between a sentencing hearing and 
a probation evidentiary hearing, in that an appellate court can presume a trial court's 
sentencing determination is supported by the facts in the record. However, Morrison 
and Chapman indicate that no such appellate presumption is applied to the evidentiary 
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potion of probation revocation proceedings. In State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568 (2011 ), 
the court held that a district court need not expressly articulate it's the reasons for its 
sentencing determination on the record. Id. at 575. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
also held that "when a trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, [the appellate 
court] will examine the record to determine the implicit findings that underlie the trial 
court's determination and uphold those implicit findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence." State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 659 (Ct. App. 1999).) As 
addressed above, Morrissey and Chapman make it clear that, in Idaho, a district court 
must make factual findings and provide reasoning from those findings to support a 
finding that a probationer violated a term of probation. The district court did not make its 
required findings in this case, and neither the State nor this Court can look at the record 
and presume that the information in record supports the district court's determination 
that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation. 
In sum, the district court based its determination that Mr. White violated the terms 
of his probation based solely on the magistrate's probable cause determination. Since, 
the district court did not independently make this determination based on any other facts 
in this record, that determination cannot be upheld on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. White respectfully requests that this Court remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2015. . .· 7 "--
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SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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